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RECASTING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE’S NET 
Zach Huffman* 
INTRODUCTION 
The summer of 2020 thrust the relationship between law enforcement and 
racial minorities squarely into this country’s collective consciousness.  After 
witnessing horrible instances of police misconduct, large portions of the U.S. 
population called for reforms, from abolishing the police1 to revoking legal 
doctrines like qualified immunity.2  However, operating behind these visible 
debates are rules that arguably unfairly tip the scales in favor of the police 
and effectively make racial minorities vulnerable to unjustifiable coercion at 
the hands of law enforcement.3 
One such doctrine is the exclusionary rule.  At first glance the rule seems 
to protect individuals, not assist police—it directs courts to exclude evidence, 
in certain circumstances, if evidence introduced at trial was obtained through 
a violation of the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.4  But in Herring v. 
United States,5 the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the circumstances in which 
the exclusionary rule applies, limiting it to situations involving “reckless, 
deliberate, or grossly negligent conduct,” or to “recurring or systemic 
negligence.”6  Herring effectively eroded any meaningful protection that the 
exclusionary rule once offered;7 the rule is now extremely forgiving of police 
misbehavior. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; A.M., 2015, University of 
Chicago; A.B., 2014, Princeton University.  Thank you to the Fordham Law Review editors 
for their careful review and commitment to this Comment. 
 
 1. See Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defund-
police.html [https://perma.cc/G7H3-KGQ9]. 
 2. See Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Opinion, The One Police Reform That Both the Left and 
the Right Support, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
06/02/opinion/breonna-taylor-police.html [https://perma.cc/F8JX-CL4B]. 
 3. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 59-96 (rev. ed. 2012) (discussing how features of the U.S. 
criminal justice system impact racial minorities). 
 4. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83 (1976). 
 5. 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 6. See id. at 144. 
 7. See id. at 156 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Herring has had significant impact on minorities.  The disproportionately 
high rate of interactions between minorities and law enforcement places 
minorities at higher risk of suffering violations to their constitutional rights 
due to police misconduct.8  Without a robust exclusionary rule, minorities 
have few, if any, mechanisms to remedy the wrongs they have experienced.9  
And even when the exclusionary rule can be invoked, access to justice issues 
make it difficult for minorities to win on their colorable claims.10 
While Herring has erected significant obstacles for minorities attempting 
to vindicate their constitutional rights, those obstacles are not unassailable.  
As public attention imposes pressure for reform, litigants may look to address 
other legal doctrines like qualified immunity, the downstream effect of which 
would be better compliance with the Fourth Amendment.11  Litigants could 
also advocate for recalibrating the exclusionary rule by asking courts to 
broaden the number of circumstances in which the exclusionary rule 
applies.12  Finally, litigants may begin to chip away at the outer limits of 
Herring by drilling down on what the Court meant by asserting that the 
exclusionary rule applies in instances of “deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic 
negligence.”13 
Part I explains the exclusionary rule.  It begins with the theoretical basis 
for the rule, then describes how the rule traditionally functioned, and 
concludes by discussing how Herring changed the legal landscape.  Part II 
explains why Herring is particularly problematic for minorities looking to 
vindicate their constitutional rights.  Part III explores three avenues of 
reform. 
PART I:  THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”14  Notably absent in the amendment, 
however, is a remedy to provide redress when these rights are violated or to 
ensure the rights are upheld in the first instance.  To fill this gap, the U.S. 
Supreme Court fashioned the exclusionary rule as a remedy providing 
criminal defendants the opportunity at trial to suppress evidence collected as 
the result of a Fourth Amendment violation.15  Without this rule, “the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value.”16 
 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. Herring, 555 U.S. at 156 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; see also infra Part III. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 15. Claire Angelique Nolasco et al., What Herring Hath Wrought:  An Analysis of Post-
Herring Cases in the Federal Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 222 (2011). 
 16. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). 
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Perhaps counterintuitively, the rule exists not to redress the particular 
Fourth Amendment violation the defendant suffered, but rather to “deter 
future unlawful police conduct.”17  This is because using the tainted evidence 
at trial is not a constitutional violation—the defective search or seizure is.18  
Thus, whether evidence can be excluded at trial is a separate issue from 
whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.19  Because the 
exclusionary rule is not meant to make any one particular individual whole 
by remedying the constitutional wrong, the rule applies only in those 
situations where it will actually work:  when deterring unlawful police 
conduct is achievable.20 
To determine whether deterrence is possible, courts undertake a “rigorous 
weighing” of costs and benefits,21 balancing the likelihood of deterring the 
future bad act with the substantial societal cost of excluding probative 
evidence from trial and potentially allowing a guilty person to go free.22  If 
the likelihood of deterrence is “appreciable,” the tainted evidence will be 
excluded; however, if deterrence is unlikely, exclusion is not warranted, and 
the evidence is admitted.23  By this logic, if the officer would have violated 
a constitutional right even with the threat of exclusion looming, then 
deterrence is unattainable, the cost of letting the guilty go free is too high, 
and, accordingly, the exclusionary rule does not apply. 
This model should ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment.  
Society has an interest in law enforcement abiding by the Constitution and 
an interest in punishing the guilty.  Letting the guilty go free because of 
excluded evidence should deter officers—who have an interest in “locking 
away bad guys”24—from committing errors.  Thus, officers will endeavor to 
follow the Constitution to keep guilty persons from avoiding punishment.  
The exclusionary rule, then, ensures that both societal interests are met. 
Refining this idea further, the Court has constructed an exception 
identifying when deterrence is not achievable.  This good faith exception 
explains that “illegally obtained evidence is admissible in court despite the 
existence of any error or mistake, ‘as long as the error or mistake was not 
committed by the police, or, if committed by the police, the error or mistake 
was honest and reasonable.’”25  The exception seems to be congruent with 
the exclusionary rule’s theoretical basis in deterrence—excluding evidence 
will not deter law enforcement officers from committing constitutional 
violations if the officers believed they themselves acted reasonably or if they 
relied upon others whose actions the officers had no reason to suspect were 
 
 17. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). 
 18. See id. at 353–54. 
 19. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
223 (1983)). 
 20. Id. at 11. 
 21. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011). 
 22. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). 
 23. Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). 
 24. Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 1077, 1083 (2011). 
 25. Nolasco et al., supra note 15, at 222 (citation omitted). 
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unconstitutional.26  In short, deterrence only works if the law enforcement 
officials knew or should have known their behavior was inappropriate.27 
A trilogy of cases demonstrates how the good faith exception operates.  In 
United States v. Leon,28 the Court held that the good faith exception applied 
when police officers relied on a facially valid, but defective warrant issued 
by a magistrate to carry out a search, concluding that the costs of excluding 
“inherently trustworthy tangible evidence” outweighed the possible benefits 
of deterrence.29  The exclusionary rule was inapplicable here because (1) the 
rule was meant to deter police, not magistrates; (2) there was no evidence 
that judges or magistrates were “inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth 
Amendment,” so “the extreme sanction of exclusion” was not required to 
ensure that magistrates followed the law; and (3) applying the exclusionary 
rule here would not deter future misconduct by judges or magistrates issuing 
search warrants.30  In essence, the police reasonably relied on the conduct of 
a non-law enforcement officer—the magistrate.  Excluding evidence would 
punish the wrong audience—judges, not police—and would not alter any 
future conduct because police would continue to rely upon the probable cause 
determination of judges. 
Leon’s logic appears clearly in the next two cases of the trilogy.  In Illinois 
v. Krull,31 the good faith exception applied when an officer relied on a state 
statute later declared to be unconstitutional.32  The Court noted that exclusion 
would have minimal deterrent effect because the officer “simply fulfilled his 
responsibility to enforce the statute as written.”33  And like magistrates, the 
Court found no reason to believe exclusion would successfully ensure that 
legislators wrote constitutional statutes.34  Similarly, in Arizona v. Evans,35 
the good faith exception applied to officers’ reliance on “erroneous computer 
record[s]” maintained by court officials.36  Again deploying Leon, the Court 
found no evidence that court employees are “inclined to ignore or subvert the 
Fourth Amendment” or that exclusion would deter future court employee 
misconduct.37  Finally, there was no indication that exclusion would deter 
the arresting officer either—officers would continue to rely on records 
produced by court staffs.38 
Despite this established case law, the Court’s decision in Herring appears 
to have significantly altered the good faith exception.  The facts of the case 
 
 26. See id. 
 27. Tort law can be seen as a corollary to the exclusionary rule. See Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 153 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 28. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 29. Id. at 907. 
 30. Id. at 915–17. 
 31. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
 32. Id. at 355–57. 
 33. Id. at 350. 
 34. Id. at 351. 
 35. 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 36. Id. at 14. 
 37. Id. at 11 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987)). 
 38. Id. at 15–16. 
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are well rehearsed.  In July 2004, Bennie Dean Herring arrived at the Coffee 
County, Alabama Sherriff’s Department to retrieve items from his 
impounded truck.39  Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Herring was at 
the department, and knowing that Herring had a criminal record, asked the 
county’s warrant clerk to check for any outstanding warrants naming 
Herring.40  When the clerk found none, she contacted her colleague in 
neighboring Dale County, who determined that Dale County indeed had an 
outstanding warrant for Herring’s arrest.41  Armed with this information, 
Anderson arrested Herring as he left the department and found him in 
possession of drugs and a pistol.42  However, the Dale County clerk had made 
a mistake.43  As Herring was being stopped in Coffee County, the Dale 
County clerk realized there was an error with the record—Herring’s warrant 
had been recalled five months earlier.44  The realization occurred too late—
Herring had already been arrested.45 
Upon first glance, it appears like the exclusionary rule should have applied.  
Unlike in the trilogy discussed above, here police conduct was defective.  
Nevertheless, the Court found that the good faith exception applied.46  
Affirming Leon and its progeny, the Court recognized that the exclusionary 
rule is triggered when exclusion meaningfully deters future bad conduct.47  
But apparently breaking with precedent, the Court added a heightened fault 
requirement, writing that “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or 
systemic negligence.”48  Errors resulting from “nonrecurring and attenuated 
negligence [are too] far removed from the core concerns that” led to the rule’s 
adoption.49  Finding no evidence that the police were reckless in relying on 
the incorrect record or that there was systemic negligence in maintaining the 
database, Herring’s motion to suppress was denied.50 
Although the Court couched its opinion as an incremental extension of the 
rule, scholars have noted a number of reasons why Herring is a significant 
change.51  First, before Herring, the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence 
had never required “a showing of heightened misconduct”52 by incorporating 
 
 39. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 138. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 138–39. 
 47. See id. 147–48. 
 48. Id. at 144. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 147–48. 
 51. There is extensive scholarship on Herring and the exclusionary rule more generally.  
For a more complete discussion, see generally, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring:  
A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009). 
 52. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring:  Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 671 (2011). 
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a form of mens rea into the deterrence calculus.53  No longer would mere 
negligence be enough to trigger the exclusionary rule because, in the Court’s 
opinion, such low levels of fault cannot be meaningfully deterred.54  
According to some commentators,  Herring severely diluted the rule by 
“effectively narrow[ing] [it] to evidence obtained only pursuant to systemic 
negligence and to flagrant and reckless violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.”55  Second, pre-Herring, the good faith exception applied to 
“evidence illegally obtained by police officers in ‘objectively reasonable 
reliance’ on errors committed by nonlaw-enforcement personnel.”56  But in 
Herring, the Court applied the exception to an error committed by the police 
and thereby broke down the law enforcement/non-law enforcement 
distinction central to the Court’s previous holdings.  At bottom, Herring’s 
cabining of the exclusionary rule has left most violations of the Fourth 
Amendment without a remedy.57 
PART II:  HERRING AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES 
Herring has potentially far-reaching consequences,58 which will not be felt 
evenly throughout the population.  Like many Fourth Amendment doctrines, 
Herring’s revamped good faith exception may disproportionately impact 
minority communities, who disproportionately interact with law 
enforcement, and thus will be disproportionately subjected to the errors that 
law enforcement officials inevitably commit.  Statistics on law enforcement 
interactions show that minorities are involved in all stages of the criminal 
justice system more than they should be based on their share of the total 
population.59  According to data from 2015, Black people make up 18 percent 
of individuals stopped by police, while only accounting for 12 percent of the 
total population.60  Data reflecting interactions with police in New York City 
between 2014 and 2017 show that Black people accounted for 53 percent of 
stops, Latinx people 28 percent, and white people 11 percent.61  Similarly, in 
 
 53. Kerr, supra note 24, at 1105. 
 54. Laurin, supra note 52, at 682.  This does not seem to comport with deterrence in other 
contexts, most notably torts. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 55. Nolasco et al., supra note 15, at 224 (citation omitted). 
 56. Id. at 223 (first citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921-22 (1984); then citing 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1987)). 
 57. See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States:  A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 463 (2009). 
 58. See generally, e.g., Kay L. Levine et al., Evidence Laundering in a Post-Herring 
World, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 627 (2017) (describing how evidence tainted by a 
constitutional violation is “laundered” as it passes from the offending officer to a second 
officer to, ultimately, the prosecutor). 
 59. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 97–139 (arguing why crime rates cannot explain this 
incongruence). 
 60. Wendy Sawyer, Visualizing the Racial Disparities in Mass Incarceration, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 27, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/07/27/disparities/ 
[https://perma.cc/2JQ8-JKYT]. 
 61. CHRISTOPHER DUNN & MICHELLE SHAMES, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-
FRISK IN THE DE BLASIO ERA 9 (2019), 
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Washington, D.C., 72 percent of individuals stopped are Black, despite 
accounting for only 46 percent of D.C.’s population.62 
Numbers on arrests and prison sentences tell a similar story.  According to 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
while Black and Latinx people together only represent 32 percent of the total 
U.S. population, they represent 56 percent of the country’s incarcerated 
population.63  Black people are also more likely to be arrested and more 
likely to be arrested multiple times in the same year.64  21 percent of people 
arrested once in 2017 were Black, and 28 percent arrested multiple times in 
2017 were Black.65  The Prison Policy Initiative determined that “42% of 
people arrested and booked 3 or more times were Black.”66 
Herring makes this outsized contact with law enforcement problematic for 
at least two reasons.  First, extending the new good faith exception, with its 
heightened fault requirement, to police officers and their support staffs 
immunizes them from a wide range of errors, particularly computer errors, 
which like in Herring itself, could lead to mistaken warrants, criminal 
histories, or identifying information used to justify searches resulting in 
illegally seized evidence.  According to amicus briefs filed by the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, law enforcement relies on databases rife with 
errors, and those errors spread quickly among government entities through 
federal programs encouraging law enforcement cooperation.67  These 
databases contain records of “incident, offense, and case reports, as well as 
arrest, booking, incarceration, and parole or probation information from 
federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities,” as well as personally 
identifiable information.68  In a 2005 report by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), state criminal history records, which national databases collect, are 
rife with significant backlogs, outdated records and records without final 




 62. METRO. POLICE DEP’T WASH., D.C., STOP DATA REPORT:  FEBRUARY 2020 9 (2020), 
https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/Stop%20Data
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF7H-GUAG]. 
 63. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-
sheet/ [https://perma.cc/KCH4-7JBQ] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021). 
 64. See Press Release, Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Prison Pol’y Initiative, Arrest, 
Release, Repeat:  How Police and Jails Are Misused to Respond to Social Problems (Aug. 
2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html [https://perma.cc/5S77-
6W3H]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. in Support 
of Petitioner at 7–8, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (No. 07-513) [hereinafter 
Herring Amicus]. 
 68. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. in Support 
of Respondent at 11–12, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373) (citation 
omitted) [hereinafter Strieff Amicus]. 
 69. Herring Amicus, supra note 67, at 11.  The 2005 report found a backlog of 2.5 million 
records and that twenty three states had not completed full audits to verify the accuracies of 
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the DOJ invested $390 million to fix these deficiencies, but its 2005 report 
admitted that the influx of capital did little to remedy the problem.70  The 
DOJ also recognized in 2001 that there is a “substantial risk that . . . user[s] 
will make . . . incorrect or misguided decision[s]” based on these national law 
enforcement databases.71  As of 2016, the reliance on computer databases 
has only increased and the errors persist.72 
In sum, officers are armed with immense amounts of data that can be used 
during searches and seizures, and now, with Herring’s protection, they can 
justify their actions with error-riddled information while facing almost no 
repercussions if their actions are unconstitutional.  Herring himself provides 
a prime example.  If not for the faulty Dale County record, he could have 
avoided prosecution.  The problem is exacerbated for minorities, who 
disproportionately interact with law enforcement agents.  More interactions, 
even if they result in no formal charges, mean more opportunities for law 
enforcement to collect information that could later be improperly relied on 
during a search or seizure in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
Second, even when a defendant has a colorable suppression claim, 
Herring’s heightened fault standard makes it almost impossible to vindicate 
the defendant’s rights.  This is because only “especially explicit and 
egregious” conduct, of the type that clearly demonstrates “[c]ontempt for the 
law,” will fulfill Herring’s requirement that police action be reckless, 
deliberate, or grossly negligent.73  Although Herring contends that 
determining whether conduct rises to this standard is an objective inquiry,74 
recklessness or gross negligence necessarily requires some subjective 
analysis.75  Given the Court’s established reluctance to consider subjectivity 
in Fourth Amendment cases,76 defendants must have experienced a facially 
flagrant constitutional violation, or marshal significant discovery to show the 
police error satisfies Herring.77  Courts are unlikely to ever grant such 
discovery, setting up a situation where members of minority communities—
those who are most likely to interact with police and thus most likely to suffer 
 
their criminal records in the previous five years.  Meanwhile, thirteen states reported no plans 
to do an audit in the subsequent three years. Id. at 14–15. 
 70. Id. at 15–16. 
 71. Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
 72. See generally Strieff Amicus, supra note 68.  As of 2016, the National Crime 
Information Center, a major federal database, contained more than 13 million records 
accessible by organizations including state, city, tribal agencies, sentencing commissions, and 
penal institutions. Id. at 8.  The National Data Exchange, a central repository used by various 
criminal justice entities, contained 500 million records as of 2015. Id. at 11. 
 73. Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1551 
(2018). 
 74. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145–46 (2009). 
 75. Kerr, supra note 24, at 1105. 
 76. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813–14 (1996). 
 77. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019) (demonstrating 
how much discovery is required, albeit in the administrative law context, to show the 
subjective decision-making processes of government officials). 
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abuse—cannot in practice meet the pleading requirement despite, in theory, 
having a viable claim.78 
Even assuming a defendant can access the necessary evidence, Herring’s 
standard impacts minorities in even more indirect ways.  Herring requires 
complicated legal work—properly requesting discovery, reviewing 
evidence, filing the appropriate motion, and demonstrating the elements have 
been met—which necessitates effective representation.  While the Sixth 
Amendment mandates providing criminal defendants effective counsel,79 the 
considerable pressures exerted on public defenders and their clients push 
cases to plea bargaining long before motions to suppress are heard.80  And 
while defendants have the option of retaining private representation, doing 
so is frequently unattainable, either because an individual defendant cannot 
afford a lawyer or simply does not have the knowledge or support to find 
one.  The very people who most disproportionately interact with the criminal 
justice system—members of minority communities—are also the people 
faced with significant access to justice obstacles that make success for the 
sliver of cases Herring left on the table unlikely. 
Despite the substantial changes Herring wrought, the decision emphasizes 
the traditional balance between the societal costs of suppressing evidence and 
the likelihood of deterring future unconstitutional behavior that lies at the 
core of exclusionary rule jurisprudence.  But it does so at great harm to 
communities subjected to outsized contact with law enforcement.  And while 
it was not the intention, Herring ultimately is another mechanism 
perpetuating this problem. 
PART III:  WHAT TO DO ABOUT HERRING? 
Herring has clearly made it difficult for a defendant to successfully 
exclude evidence, and given that subsequent good faith exception cases have 
approvingly cited the new standard,81 it appears Herring is here to stay.  So, 
what should be done?  This Part highlights three avenues of exploration, 
where recalibrating the scales so that police officers do not run roughshod 
over constitutional rights seems at least plausible. 
A:  Looking Elsewhere 
Because Herring is entrenched as good law,82 it may be fruitful to look 
elsewhere for relief.  A civil corollary to the exclusionary rule is 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (§ 1983).83  Section 1983 allows individuals who suffer violations of 
 
 78. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 111, 117. 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 80. The Court has acknowledged that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and 
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” Missouri v. Frye, 556 
U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (citation omitted).  As a result, the Court has stated that the criminal 
justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” Lafler v. Cooper, 
556 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
 81. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 239 (2011). 
 82. See id. 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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their constitutional rights committed by state officials in their official 
capacities to sue for money damages or injunctive relief.84  In limited 
circumstances, § 1983 allows individuals to also sue government entities, 
like police departments, for money damages or injunctive relief.85  But just 
as the good faith exception excuses officers for violating constitutional rights 
in the exclusion context, the qualified immunity doctrine excuses officers in 
the § 1983 context.86  According to that doctrine, an officer is responsible for 
a constitutional violation only if the “contours of the right [were] sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing 
violates that right.”87  This standard requires “exceptionally clear evidence 
that a defendant’s actions were so objectively ultra vires that he or she either 
knew or should have known that what he or she did was wrong,”88 which 
ultimately protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”89  While qualified immunity presents its own problems, the 
trouble is compounded when considered alongside the exclusionary rule.  
The exclusionary rule will not deter police officers as evidence will almost 
always be admitted, and they will not fear civil penalties under § 1983 
because they enjoy qualified immunity.  Taken together there is little 
deterring officers from violating constitutional rights. 
But, perhaps unlike the exclusionary rule, there is reason to think qualified 
immunity will be reformed.  Justice Thomas has repeatedly called for the 
Court to review qualified immunity, arguing that the doctrine rests on rocky 
jurisprudential footing.90  He has argued that the current immunity test has 
no connection to the tort immunities that served as the drafting backdrop for 
§ 1983.91  And further, he has asserted that good faith was not always enough 
historically to protect officials from answering for their constitutional 
wrongs.92  Justice Thomas is not alone—the recent events surrounding the 
deaths of George Floyd93 and Breonna Taylor94 have thrust qualified 
immunity firmly into the public view and inspired mainstream news outlets 
to write comprehensive pieces on the doctrine.95  Such public attention, 
 
 84. Id. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 85. See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 86. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 6–9 (2017). 
 87. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 88. Huq & Lakier, supra note 73, at 1550. 
 89. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). 
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combined with apparent judicial willingness, could create a powerful 
movement to make critical changes. 
Making it easier to hold law enforcement officers civilly liable for their 
actions may encourage them to change their behavior to avoid liability 
resulting from successful § 1983 claims.  As a derivative effect, we would 
see fewer Fourth Amendment violations, resulting in fewer situations in 
which a defendant would face Herring’s high bar for exclusion.  Some 
commentators believe that officers would be sensitive to the consequences of 
civil liability.96  While studies have shown that officers are not sensitive to 
the financial risk,97 some evidence suggests that officers will change their 
behavior if they believe a constitutional violation will result in a guilty person 
going free.98  It is also worth noting that according to one study, police pay 
money damages so infrequently–fewer than one half of 1 percent in a study 
of forty-four major jurisdictions–99 that it is no surprise they do not fear the 
monetary consequences of a § 1983 suit.  If qualified immunity is relaxed so 
that officers face liability more often than they do now, the financial pressure 
may also lead to better police behavior. 
B:  Getting Back to Basics 
Another approach to find relief in Herring’s wake is to challenge the 
foundations on which the exclusionary rule is built.  The traditional inquiry 
for the rule asks whether the likelihood that excluding evidence will prevent 
the undesirable constitutional violation from happening again outweighs the 
intense societal cost of letting a guilty person go free.100  This analysis is 
arguably a myopic one, however, as it only considers two variables; there are 
potentially other societal costs to consider. 
One such factor, especially in light of recent examples of social and racial 
injustice, is judicial integrity.  As people lose faith in the justice system, the 
rule of law can falter, and data suggests that the public is at least skeptical of 
our current system.  According to the NAACP, 84 percent of Black adults 
believe that police treat white people better than Black people, and 63 percent 
of white adults agree with this opinion.101  Similarly, 87 percent of Black 
adults believe the U.S. criminal justice system, which includes the judiciary, 
“is more unjust towards Black people” than white people.102  61 percent of 
white adults share this opinion.103 
 
Police Emerges as Flash Point Amid Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualified-immunity.html 
[https://perma.cc/W2P3-LZ4Q]. 
 96. See Huq & Lakier, supra note 73, at 1566–68. 
 97. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:  Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 354–57 (2000). 
 98. See Huq & Lakier, supra note 73, at 1566–68. 
 99. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014). 
 100. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
 101. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, supra note 63. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
110 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 89 
Including judicial integrity as part of the balancing test is not a foreign 
concept, especially in the criminal law context.  Judicial integrity has been 
weighed in determining whether sentencing guidelines have been 
miscalculated,104 whether a defendant has suffered prejudicial error at 
trial,105 and even whether evidence should be suppressed.106  Scholars, too, 
have proposed revamped balancing tests to better account for integrity and 
fairness in the criminal process.107 
Certainly, concerns about judicial integrity, coupled with the deterrent 
value of exclusion, should not lead to suppression of evidence in every 
instance.  Instead, introducing a new variable like judicial integrity should 
recalibrate the balancing test to make the process fairer.  Fairness and 
integrity are not simply normative values—they are cornerstones of our 
Constitution.108  Vindicating constitutional rights in the correct cases, even 
if they will not appreciably lead to deterrence, can instill (or rebuild) trust in 
the judicial process that is critical to our core notions of the rule of law. 
Decisions about exclusion do not only impact police officers.  
Consequences ripple to the individuals whose constitutional rights were 
infringed and those watching, who believe that excusing the “constable’s 
blunder” is a failure of our system. 109  Changing the balance by considering 
judicial integrity might begin to rectify the problem Herring exacerbated. 
C:  Taking Herring Hook, Line, and Sinker 
Finally, litigants could confront Herring on its own terms.  Herring made 
clear that the exclusionary rule will apply when law enforcement conduct is 
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.”110  Less clear is what the Court 
meant when it said that the rule applies to “systemic negligence.”111  If police 
conduct will rarely satisfy the reckless, deliberate, and grossly negligent 
prong, perhaps attacking instances of systemic negligence is the key.  Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor foreshadowed this possibility in Evans: 
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Surely it would not be reasonable for the police to rely, say, on a 
recordkeeping system, their own or some other agency’s, that has no 
mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that routinely leads to false 
arrests, even years after the probable cause for any such arrest has ceased 
to exist (if it ever existed).112 
Justice O’Connor made her point in the context of electronic databases, 
which law enforcement officials heavily rely upon despite the abundance of 
errors in these databases that could easily lead to Fourth Amendment 
violations.113  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion made this 
point again in Herring itself.114  Nevertheless, the Court has not taken the 
bait to rule that extensive errors in computer databases without attempts at 
remediation qualify as systemic negligence.115  Naturally, one might ask, if 
that is not systemic negligence, what is? 
Despite this hazard, defining systemic negligence more precisely may be 
the vulnerable underbelly to an otherwise sealed doctrine.  At least in the 
recordkeeping context, there is evidence to marshal a claim, and the Court 
itself has intimated that computer databases contain characteristics that could 
make a systemic negligence claim colorable.  There may be other contexts to 
pursue as well.116  Nevertheless, the evidentiary lift to succeed with this 
strategy is likely significant, especially given the access to justice issues that 
many criminal defendants face.117  But this small opening should still be 
exploited to determine exactly where the contours of systemic negligence fit 
within the exclusionary rule.  It may be a fruitful way to take Herring head 
on. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite claims that it is a logical extension of existing doctrine, Herring 
changed the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule by requiring a 
heightened fault standard and breaking down the law enforcement/non-law 
enforcement distinction central to the Court’s previous exclusionary rule 
cases.  Herring’s impact is not simply doctrinal; the case disproportionately 
harms minority communities.  Because of their heightened contact with 
police, minorities are more likely than their white counterparts to suffer a 
violation of their constitutional rights.  And with the high bar Herring 
imposes, it is difficult to vindicate those wrongs.  But Herring does not have 
to be the end of the line.  Litigants may try to mend exclusionary rule doctrine 
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by reforming related legal principles like qualified immunity; recalibrating 
the balance at the core of the exclusionary rule; or working to define the 
boundaries announced in Herring more clearly.  While it will not be easy, 
restoring balance to the exclusionary rule will help mitigate at least some of 
the wrongs our country’s minorities experience at the hands of our justice 
system. 
